Bhaso Ndzendze
The year 2024 saw about two-dozen African countries hold elections. It was one of mixed results for Africa’s democratic practices.
While there were notable successes in the peaceful transfer of power and strength of institutions (Botswana, Ghana and Senegal for example), others (notably Mozambique) played into the usual script of post-election violence, alongside questions of whether they were all free and fair. And then there were the elections that never were – those under military regimes who came to power through force and have consistently kicked voting days down the road.
After the restoration of political independence to African territories in the 1950s and 1960s, military coups became so prevalent that the study of African politics was seen by many scholars as merely the study of military regimes. Beginning with Togo in 1963, the majority of Africa’s leaders were more likely to have been brought to power through a military coup than the ballot box. The 1990s brought some positive changes. With the end of the Cold War, dozens of African countries experienced democratisation. For the first time, a considerable contingent of leaders in the Organisation of African Unity, later the African Union (AU), were democratically elected. These leaders took steps to insulate the continent from future coups by introducing the Lome Declaration which, among other others, saw the member states commit to “strongly condemn[ing] all forms of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa, coup perpetrators and manipulation of democratic processes”.
A welcome pattern emerged; military coups declined in frequency, while leaders who took power militarily stayed for shorter periods of time were more likely to give reasons for their actions, and committed to returning to civilian rule within a short period of time. On average, 20.4 months, but after the Lome Declaration, they typically stayed for 10.5 months. Political scientist Issaka K. Souaré considers this a successful case of ‘norm entrepreneurship’ on the part of the OAU and the AU. In other words, the continental bodies de-normalised the forceful taking of power.
However, cracks soon emerged. An interesting statistic to note is that from the 1960s through to the 1990s, there were more frequent coup attempts, with a success rate of 49%. After the 2000s, there have been fewer attempts, but they have tended to enjoy a much higher success rate at 67%. Additionally, the AU as well as regional bodies and the wider world have not been consistent in their reactions to coups. Indeed, some coups or coup-like events, notably the removals of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (2017) and Omar al-Bashir of Sudan (2019), have even been celebrated. This is in part due to frustration with dictators’ decades-long rule. Nevertheless, it sends the message that military overthrows can be acceptable, thereby unintentionally firming up precedent for further coups.
These coups happened for various reasons, ranging from the death of the incumbent to allegations of corruption, Western foreign domination, economic mismanagement and failure to defeat terrorism by the previous regimes. True to the post-Lome tendency, they have all initially made commitments to organising elections as soon as possible. However, they have all so far postponed these, and, contrary to the norm, are not giving the appearance of civilian rule. The regional body closest to the action, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has been unable to pressure them to hold elections. Indeed, the unprecedented geographic proximity of these coup regimes seems to have given them a sense of allyship, formalised through the Alliance of Sahel States, consisting of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.
South Africa’s position and trade interests
So, what has been South Africa’s position on these? Coincidentally, the 2020 coup in Mali took place with President Cyril Ramaphosa as chair of the African Union. In the wake of these coups, the South African government has expressed condemnation, notably in the cases of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. A look at South Africa’s ties to the countries before and after the coups shows that they have had no direct impact, particularly on South African export to the junta-led countries.
Burkina Faso
South Africa’s imports from Burkina Faso were less than a million rand a decade ago. Following the removal of long-time president Blaise Compaore (himself installed through a coup he initiated against his close collaborator Thomas Sankara), they grew and reached a peak of R46 million in 2019. They have since come nowhere close. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic they subsequently declined, but rebounded again in 2021, reaching R16.3m. Since 2022, the year of the coup, they have been on a downward trend, falling by 47.6% from R3.86m (2022) to R2.02m (2023). On the other hand, South Africa’s exports to the country have been impervious to everything, including the pandemic and the coups. A decade ago, they were worth R267.5m; as of 2023 they are at R863.4m. The 2022 coup seems to have made no difference, with South African exports enjoying a 29.6% year-on-year growth.
Mali
South Africa’s imports from Mali have grown threefold since a decade ago; from R18.8m to R68m as of 2023. The double coups in 2020 and 2021, within nine months of each other, still saw a continuation of the growth trajectory in Malian exports to South Africa, which began in earnest in 2017. Similarly, South African exports to Mali have grown considerably, from R708.m in 2014, to over a billion by 2023. The coup year of 2020 saw a 14% decline, before growth resumed in 2021, the year of the second coup, by 17.9%.
Chad
In the decade between 2013 and 2023, South Africa’s trade with Chad has seen volatile periods of growth and decline, moving in non-linear fashion, but tend to remain within their respective export and import value ranges. Overall, South Africa’s imports from Chad are very low. In the decade under review, they have barely surpassed the R1m mark (doing so only 2014, 2016, and 2021). In 2013 they were worth R254 thousand by 2023 were still at a total R500 thousand.
South Africa’s exports to the country have moved from R44.5m in 2013, to R44.1m in 2023. In the years within this decade, there have been peaks and valleys, particularly in 2018 (R47.5m) and 2016 (R13.7m). Nevertheless, the period since the 2021 coup seems to have had no effect on the trade. In 2021, South Africa’s exports were at a total R18.1m and have subsequently moved up considerably to R48.4m (2022) and R44.1m (2023).
Guinea
South Africa’s imports from Guinea have grown from R2.1m in 2014 to R44.7m in 2023. The period in between has been a volatile one, with the figure peaking at R648.3m in 2015, and reaching lows of around R2m in 2014, 2016 and 2018. Still, by the time of the 2021 coup the figure had settled at R18.9 million and has only grown ever since. We observe nearly uninterrupted growth in South African exports to Guinea. A decade ago, they were worth R277.3m and in 2023 they were worth R1.05 billion; a growth rate of 260%. The two years since the coup have seen a near-doubling in South African exports to the West African country.
No sanctions
Although there have been political sanctions at the AU level, there are clearly no trade sanctions on the part of South Africa towards any of these coup regimes. Trade has carried on unimpeded with all the regimes, and has even seen considerable growth in some years. Should steps be taken to roll back some or all of this trade, given the unconstitutional manner in which these regimes have come about? Quite the contrary! The continent lacks measures to coerce or persuade these regimes precisely because of the already limited intra-continental trade among member states. Presently, South Africa’s exports represent barely 1% of the military juntas’ total imports, showing the already limited leverage Pretoria enjoys towards these predominantly West African states. To put it more bluntly, then, you cannot sanction a country with which you have no meaningful trade to begin with. The spate of coups would roll back the already-slow gains being made under the African Continental Free Trade Area. Importantly, South Africa’s trade with the regimes has so far not consisted of any explicit weapons supplies which are being used to oppress their populations.
History shows that countries overcome coups of their own accord and individual trajectories. Trade ties present the opportunity to influence in a positive direction. But do so, they must be allowed to grow first.
Bhaso Ndzendze is an associate professor of politics and international relations at the University of Johannesburg. His work focuses on sovereignty, encompassing on territorial disputes, technology and trade, as well as executive power. His recent books are Super President: The History and Future of Executive Power in South Africa (UJ Press, 2024) and The Political Economy of Sino-South African Trade and Regional Competition (published by Palgrave in 2022).
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