Opinion

DA Seeks Electoral Supremacy Through Generational Change

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS

Prof. Dirk Kotzé|Published

(FROM LEFT) New leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA) Geordin Hill-Lewis, Federal Chairperson Solly Msimanga and Johannesburg mayoral candidate Helen Zille on the party's local government elections campaign in Pimville, Soweto on April 13. The challenge for the DA’s new young leadership is that they can serve as role models, but they will have to develop a political strategy which is not primarily focused on elections, says the writer.

Image: Itumeleng English/Independent Newspapers

Prof Dirk Kotzé

After last weekend’s DA Federal Congress, the main attraction of the new leadership is their generational change.

First among them is the 39-year-old new Federal Leader, Geodin Hill-Lewis. The pressure on South African political parties in general is to reflect a demographic profile that appeals to the South African society in general, and that also supports their own party objectives. 

The new DA leadership’s profile differs significantly from the previous cohort. Only three of them were re-elected; one of them in another position. In terms of age, one is in his 20s, five are in their 30s, two are in their 40s, and two are in their 50s.

The leadership’s geographical spread is concentrated in two provinces: four from the Western Cape, three from Gauteng, and one each from Limpopo, the Eastern Cape, and the Free State. Most noticeable is that KZN is not at all represented in the leadership, while it is the party’s third biggest province. The Black/White composition is 50/50. One tick box, which is not ticked in this composition, is the gender balance, with only one woman amongst the ten leaders. 

The younger profile is not absolutely new, but can be seen as a second wave of young leaders in the party. The generation of Mmusi Maimane, Lindiwe Mazibuko, Phumzile van Damme, Mbali Ntuli and others a decade ago was very prominent but could not be sustained, and most of them left the DA and the political terrain in general.

The main difference between them and the current youthful cohort is that it is not confined to black leaders only, but across the board, and they are already institutionally more integrated into the party in different positions than in the past. 

The big challenge for all the parties is which one of them will be first to attract the young generation during the elections.

The EFF has been successful at universities with SRC elections, though the voter turnout at such elections is very low, and therefore, it will not make a major impact on the total. The Gen Z generation has become a potent political force in many countries, especially in Madagascar, Kenya, Morocco, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and the same should be expected in South Africa.

Whether they will project their involvement in elections is very much unclear, because of the low level of public trust in South Africa in all the electoral players. Elections are, therefore, at the moment unlikely to be a credible form of young political mobilisation.

The challenge for the DA’s new young leadership is that they can serve as role models, but they will have to develop a political strategy which is not primarily focused on elections.

Given the fact that the DA’s congress happened so close to the local government elections, the new leadership’s focus will be very much on the elections. In addition to the youth, their early success will depend on whether the DA will be able to attract supporters from other parties.

Most predictions expect that the party that will experience an electoral decline is the ANC; will the DA benefit from it, given its new dynamics? Given the experience of the 2024 elections as well as the most recent opinion polls, the beneficiaries will be the MKP and EFF and to some degree the Patriotic Alliance.

The DA might also lose some support to the PA and Freedom Front Plus. However, a real possibility is that the ANC losses might not migrate to other parties, but rather be absent from voting.

Two sets of opinion polls (i.e., the Social Research Foundation and Ipsos) are currently available that indicate the likely trends in the coming elections. Both of them indicate that, at the moment, electoral support for ANC, DA and MKP might be very similar to the results of the 2024 elections.

But compared to the previous local government election in 2021, it would be a decline of about 5% for the ANC, an increase of about 1% for the DA and about 2% for the EFF. It should be noted that the 2021 election was a low point for the DA, because it lost 5.3% in comparison with the 2016 election results. The first objective for the DA would therefore be to meet their 2016 support level of 27.4%. 

The DA’s growth is still mainly in the urban areas. At the same time, almost 61% of their total number of votes in the 2024 elections were cast in two provinces: Gauteng and the Western Cape. For the DA to grow, it will have to reach the other provinces also.

The ANC’s support, on the other hand, includes a prominent rural component, and Limpopo is where their highest majority is. In 2024, most of the ANC’s losses went to the MKP, mainly in KZN and Mpumalanga. 

The newly elected DA leaders will play a dual role as party leaders and in their representative capacities. Two of them are cabinet ministers, one is a deputy minister, three are members of the Cape Town mayor committee, one is the former Tshwane mayor, and one is a provincial leader and former Tshwane mayor.

In view of the approaching local government elections, the DA’s top structure of one incumbent and two former mayors, as well as Helen Zille as a former mayor and provincial premier who will also be close to them, provides the party leadership with a very strong launch-pad of capacity and experience.

For the coming elections, one can predict that the DA will continue with their campaign strategy of emphasising their successes in government, especially local government and in the Western Cape province.

This time, however, one can expect that they will also focus very much on the successes of their six ministers in the GNU. We saw it already at the DA congress when Leon Schreiber and the others showcased their portfolios.

The DA’s prospects for the 2026 and 2029 elections will depend on a number of factors. The party has stabilised itself after the decline in the 2019 and 2021 elections. An increase in support will depend on the new, young voters, the PA’s trajectory, even more support in the urban areas and making inroads into other provinces and rural areas.

At this point in time, a significant shift of voters from the ANC to the DA is still unlikely. They will have a better chance with new voters.

The DA’s prospects in the 2029 national and provincial elections will depend on the longevity of the GNU. The DA benefits from its participation in the GNU, and if that continues until 2029, then the party’s support might reach the 25-30% bracket.

It will also be determined by who will constitute the ANC’s leadership at the time and what type of national coalition would be most likely. Without Cyril Ramaphosa as ANC president, who added to the party’s election support in the past, and a possible ANC/MKP/EFF coalition under Paul Mashatile, will make the ANC’s attraction and the DA’s prospects very fluid.

* Prof Dirk Kotzé, Department of Political Sciences, Unisa.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.